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Abstract
In the current issue of the Stanford Law Review, Richard H. Sander has published an already
widely-acclaimed study of afﬁrmative action at American law schools. The article proclaims
boldly, and contrary to received wisdom, that afﬁrmative action hurts black lawyers by causing
them to fail the bar. I show that this is incorrect. Sander’s conclusions are based on internally
inconsistent (and statistically invalid) estimates of the causal effect of attending a higher-tier
school. Correcting his assumptions and testing his hypothesis directly shows that for similarly
qualiﬁed blacks, attending a higher-tier law school has no detectable effect on bar passage rates.
1 Introduction
In his widely-acclaimed study, Sander (2004) makes two central claims. First, he argues that afﬁrmative
action has a cascade effect, namely each tier of law schools admits, on average, less-qualiﬁed black students.
Second, and more controversially, the article claims that this results in a mismatch effect. Since black
students are on average less qualiﬁed than non-blacks at a given school, blacks receive worse grades in law
school and disproportionately fail the bar.
In this Comment, I investigate the scientiﬁc validity of the causal effect of attending a higher-tier school
on bar passage. At the outset, it is important to note that Sander has no evidence as to the direct causal
effect of afﬁrmative action, since he has no data resembling a counterfactual world without afﬁrmative
action. Instead, Sander investigates the causal effect of attending a better school. The primary ﬁnding rests
on regressing bar passage on law school GPA, law school tier, and a number of other covariates. From
that regression, Sander concludes that since the standardized coefﬁcient of law school GPA is substantially
∗Thanks to Angela Early, Ian Ayres, Rick Brooks, John Donohue, Jim Greiner, Kosuke Imai, Gary King, Richard Sander, and
Liz Stuart for helpful comments.
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1higher than that of law school tier, “one is better off attending a less elite school and getting decent grades”
(Sander, 2004, p.445).
I ﬁnd that conclusion invalid for two primary reasons. First, Sander controls for an effect of the cause.
In trying to assess the causal effect of attending a higher-tier school, he controls for law school GPA, which,
by his own account, is affected by law school tier. As a result, the estimates of the effect of law school tier
are invalid. This bias is akin to a clinical trial studying the effect of aspirin on heart health in which the
researcher controls for blood pressure (which is itself affected by aspirin) after the treatment of aspirin has
been assigned. Second, Sander compares the incomparable. Estimating how students would have performed
in a counterfactual tier is an onerous empirical task precisely because students differ in all sorts of respects
across tiers. In his dataset where students and schools choose each other, Sander is trying to ﬁnd something
akin to a randomized experiment assigning students to different tiers. By reducing the role of unwarranted
assumptions I show that his conclusion holds no ground: bar passage for similarly-qualiﬁed students is
invariant to which tier of law school one attends. This study differs from Ayres and Brooks (2005) and
Chambers et al. (2005) in reaching the conclusion that law schools have no causal effect on student bar
passage. It is also the ﬁrst to point out the basic issue of controlling for a consequence of tier (lack of
identiﬁcation), to formally evaluate and analyze the study in a statistical framework of causation, and to
reassess the hypothesis by controlling for more covariates.
2 Clarifying the Assumptions
First, we should clarify the assumptions of Sander’s bar passage regression in substantive terms, to enable
thoseunfamiliarwithstatisticstounderstandthebasisonwhichtheﬁndingsrest. Thetaskistoestimatehow
students would have performed in a counterfactual law school tier. Using the standard potential outcomes
framework (Rubin, 1974; Holland, 1986), let Ti be a treatment indicator which equals the tier of school that
student i = {1,...,n} attended. Although I later estimate the effects of each tier, for ease of discussion,
suppose we were interested in the causal effect of attending a top-tier school (Ti = 1) compared to some
other school (Ti =0). LetY1i andY0i represent potential outcomes of bar passage if student attends a top-tier
school (Y1i) or does not attend a top-tier school (Y0i). Let Xi represent pretreatment covariates for student i,
most importantly LSAT scores and undergraduate GPA, but not law school GPA, as explained below.
Our quantity of interest is the causal effect of attending the top school on the probability of passing the
bar: t = E(Y1−Y0), where Y1 and Y0 are simply vectors of all potential outcomes for all n students and the
expectation is across students. Since we never jointly observe the potential outcomes (e.g., we can never
2know how one particular Stanford law student would have performed in the counterfactual world of having
attended University of Kentucky), we identify the causal effect pursuant to the following assumptions. First,
covariates are pretreatment in the sense that attendance at a top-tier school does not affect covariate values:
ASSUMPTION 1 (NO POST-TREATMENT BIAS) X0i = X1i = Xi, for all i.
However, Sander violates this assumption because he controls for law school grades, which he shows in
the ﬁrst part of the paper are themselves a consequence of attending a higher-tier school. The assumption
means that we cannot estimate the causal effect of a top-tier school by controlling for factors that are
themselves a result of school tier (King, Keohane and Verba, 1994; Rosenbaum, 2002, p. 73). To understand
this intuitively, suppose that attending a top-tier school affects bar passage solely through ones grades.
By controlling for grades, we would not estimate anything close to the causal effect of school tier (see
Appendix A for further discussion). I correct for post-treatment bias in omitting law school grades.1
Second,
ASSUMPTION 2 (NO INTERFERENCE AMONG UNITS) Y1i,Y0i ⊥ ⊥ Ti0, where i0 6= i,
which is implied by the usual independence assumption in a generalized linear model. This will hold if we
believe student performance on the bar is independent of the other students. Whether diversity has beneﬁts
beyond the student admitted, of course, is one of the key issues in afﬁrmative action, but Sander assumes
this possibility away. I do not address this in our analysis, but to the degree that interference exists, estimates
are both biased and falsely precise.2
Third, the crucial assumption is that treatment assignment is random conditional on covariates:
ASSUMPTION 3 (CONDITIONAL EXOGENEITY)

Y1i,Y0i ⊥ ⊥ Ti
	
|Xi for all i.
In other words, whether a student attends a top-tier school or not is determined solely by the observed co-
variates. Even granting this crucial assumption of the Sander study yields no detectable tier effect because
of post-treatment bias. But, of course, the assumption is not met when there are unobserved pretreatment
covariates, and the only way to make estimates believable is to control for as many pretreatment covariates
as possible. Do we truly believe that the student’s choice of school is random even if LSAT and undergrad-
uate GPA are the same? This would be violated, for example, if students who feel more comfortable in
1 This does not mean that the analysis excludes the effect that law school tier may have on grades, but rather the analysis
estimates the aggregate causal effect of tier which includes this mechanism, as well as many others (e.g., quality of teaching, peer
group, etc.).
2To relax this assumption, and potentially test the diversity hypothesis, one would need to permit for additional potential
outcomes for diversity level or peer-group covariates.
3environments where they can be “big ﬁsh” go to lower-tier schools to obtain higher grades, or if students
who are motivated by having challenging peers attend higher-tier schools when presented the option (Man-
ski, 1990). Moreover, Sander has omitted key covariates, such as undergraduate institution, family income,
student ability, and geography, which are all likely correlated with school tier and affect the likelihood of bar
passage. The key is to control for as many factors as possible to make conditional exogeneity believable.3 I
show that accounting for some 180 pretreatment covariates from the Bar Passage Study (compared to the 9
covariates that Sander controls for) yields no detectable causal effect of law school tier (see 3.4).
The logistic model, employed by Sander, makes particular functional assumption to identify a causal
effect. Chieﬂy:
ASSUMPTION 4 (LINEAR ADDITIVE LOGISTIC LINK)
1. E(Y0i|Xi) = logit−1(X0
ib), and
2. E(Y1i|Xi) = logit−1(X0
ib+t) for all i.
where logit−1 is the logistic transformation. This implies that the average treatment effect and covariates
enter the logistic link linearly and additively. If observable covariates are unbalanced between treatment
and control cases, these functional form assumptions may loom large, extrapolating from the bounds of the
data. In fact, this is very likely in the Sander data: students that are admitted to top-tier schools, for example,
are vastly different from students in low-tier schools, so estimating how these students would perform in a
counterfactual school relies on questionable modeling assumptions. This is the case particularly since the
treatment indicator is very rough (school tiers, and not individual schools). Our framework relaxes the role
of these assumptions.
3 Empirical Analysis
3.1 Confounding Covariates
Figure 1 plots the outcome, bar passage, conditional on race and tier. There is a strong positive correlation
between higher tiers for black and white students. Naturally, in large part due to the admissions system,
different types of students attend different tiers. Figure 2 plots main confounding covariates, showing the
strong correlation between undergraduate GPA and LSAT score by race and tier. Recall that Sander’s central
claim is that accounting for covariates, the tier effect becomes smaller than the reduction in grades. One
3Of course, in a setting where both students and schools determine who attends which school, the assumption remains highly
questionable.
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Figure 1: Proportion of Black and Nonblack Students Passing the Bar for Each School Tier. This Figure
demonstrates that attendance at a higher tier is associated with a higher probability of passing the bar for
both black and white students.
crucial point, however, is that the relative magnitude of law school grade and tier coefﬁcients is uninforma-
tive about the causal effect of school tier when jointly estimated because of post-treatment bias. I account
for this below by omitting law school grades, since these are precisely part of the effect of tier that Sander
purports to investigate. Note also that since law school grades are scaled for each school, these appear to be
largely independent of law school tier.
To visually anticipate our main ﬁndings, note that the primary confounding covariates appear to be
LSAT and undergraduate GPA. Figure 3 shows that rates of bar passage are comparable once we exam-
ine comparably qualiﬁed students. I now turn to a more rigorous analysis to control for other possible
confounding covariates.
3.2 Methods
Having replicated Sander’s ﬁndings exactly, I estimate the causal effect of attending a higher-tier school by
preprocessing the data via matching (Ho et al., 2004). The central idea is to identify students that are similar
in observable covariates, since the only way to identify the causal effect of attending a high-tier school is
by examining comparable students in lower-tier schools. These are the students which provide information
about how black students would have performed in lower schools (i.e., which could potentially have gone to
either school). This is not necessarily the same as the causal effect of afﬁrmative action, because in a world
without afﬁrmative action grade curves and attendance patterns would have differed more systematically.
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Figure 2: This Figure shows boxplots for undergraduate GPA (top panels), LSAT score (middle panels), and
law school GPA (bottom panels) on the y-axis by race (nonblack in left column, and black in right column)
and tier of law school (on x-axis). This Figure shows that to assess the effect of school tier, we must account
for anything that is correlated with tier and might affect bar passage. I do not control, however, for law
school GPA which is itself a consequence of tier.
The data is simply not informative about such a larger policy evaluation. Instead, our evaluation (as well
as the one implicit in Sander) is about the average causal effect of law school tier, which is potentially
estimable from the data.
In the raw data set students differ drastically from tier to tier. We thereby perform one-to-one matching
on all pretreatment covariates (LSAT, undergraduate GPA, gender, and race), considering each tier of law
school as a separate treatment.4 I also match on race exactly to consider speciﬁcally the effect on black
students. After matching, I achieve substantial balance in all covariates that Sander controls for as shown in
Table 1. That Table shows, for example, that top-tier students have an average undergraduate GPA of 3.51,
compared to 3.21 of non-top-tier students (t-stat=33.6). Matching balances each of these dimensions. As a
result, our inferences will be much less suspect to arbitrary modeling assumptions (including several high
leverage points, such as students with a GPA of zero, that would otherwise threaten regression analysis) (Ho
et al., 2004).
4This relaxes a strong and implausible linearity assumption of tier treatment that average gains are constant across all tiers of
law schools.
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Figure 3: This Figure plots binned GPA/LSAT index on the x axis and the estimated proportion of bar
passage on the y axis with 95% conﬁdence intervals broken down by blacks / nonblacks (right and left
panels, respectively) and tier 1 (grey shaded conﬁdence bands) vs. not tier 1 (dashed bands). This ﬁgure
suggests that once we look at comparably qualiﬁed students, the conﬁdence intervals intersect, meaning that
it remains difﬁcult to statistically distinguish bar passage rates between comparable tier 1 and tier 2 blacks
or nonblacks. While the mass of the bands on the right hand panel may indicate that there are gains (the
reverse mismatch hypothesis (Ayres and Brooks, 2005, see)), the precision of the estimated proportion is
insufﬁcient to distinguish these.
3.3 Results with the Original Data
Figure 4 depicts the causal effect for attending each tier of schools with 95% conﬁdence intervals estimated
by logistic regression of bar passage on proper pretreatment covariates, both pooling races and for blacks
only. For each tier, the conﬁdence intervals intersect with the origin, and we can thereby conclude little
about the causal effect of school tier. This is consistent with the notion that similarly-qualiﬁed students will
perform similarly on the bar, irrespective of law school tier.
3.4 Reassessing the Hypothesis with More Data
The above results stem from the crucial assumption that all covariates that might be related to law school
tier and that affect bar passage have been accounted for (conditional exogeneity). However, Sander controls
for only a few covariates, which makes this assumption highly implausible. I thereby collect more data to
7Raw Data Matched Data
Means Means SD T-stat Means Means SD T-stat
Treated Control Treated Control
Propensity 0.22 0.06 0.10 38.86 0.22 0.22 0.16 0.10
Score
LSAT 41.92 36.38 5.43 48.26 41.92 41.94 4.29 −0.19
UGPA 3.51 3.21 0.41 33.60 3.51 3.51 0.34 −0.47
Male 0.55 0.56 0.50 −0.56 0.55 0.54 0.50 0.67
Asian 0.07 0.04 0.19 4.62 0.07 0.05 0.23 1.65
Black 0.06 0.06 0.23 −0.34 0.06 0.05 0.23 0.54
Hisp 0.00 0.00 0.07 −0.63 0.00 0.00 0.07 −0.54
Other 0.02 0.02 0.13 0.73 0.02 0.02 0.15 −0.48
Table 1: Example of Balance in Raw (n=20,827) and Matched Data (n=3,212) when comparing students
in ﬁrst-tier schools to others. SD denotes standard deviations. Bolded t-statistics indicate a statistically sig-
niﬁcant difference in top-tier and non-top-tier students, which are reduced in the matched sample. This
Figure shows that preprocessing is likely to substantially reduce model sensitivity for major confounding
covariates (LSAT score, undergraduate GPA, gender, and race). The propensity score is simply the prob-
ability of treatment given the covariates and provides a one-dimensional summary of covariate imbalance
(Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983).
reassess the effect of law school tier. Fortunately, the LSAC Bar Passage Study includes an “Entering Stu-
dent Questionnaire,” which was administered to entering law students prior to the start of law school during
their orientation program (Wightman, 1999, p. 4). The Questionnaire contains a wealth of information
(roughly 200 covariates) about the students in the dataset, including (a) personal and family background
(e.g., student disabilities, whether the student’s mother tongue is English, whether the student plans to at-
tend law school full time, post-college full-time employment, prior legal employment, undergraduate work
experience, female and male household head education and employment, family income, marital status,
number of children, prior discrimination) (b) educational background (e.g., undergraduate major, prior de-
grees earned, year of graduation), and (c) ﬁnancial status (e.g., ﬁnancial dependents, prior loans, plans on
working during law school). Since the Questionnaire was administered before law school began, most of
these covariates are all plausibly pretreatment. I did not include any covariates from follow-up surveys
taken after law school began such as whether a student graduated from law school, law school graduation
date, ﬁrst semester and overall law school grades, number of attempts at taking the bar, expected law school
rank, educational debts, etc. I did include the region in which the bar was taken, since bar passage rates vary
drastically across jurisdictions.5
We match on 180 of these pretreatment covariates to assess the effect of a top-tier school. For space
5One might argue that students strategically select jurisdictions conditional on law school performance, but here we believe this
bias to be small in comparison to omitted variable bias due to variation in jurisdictions.
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Figure 4: Estimated Average Treatment Effects of Attending Each Tier with 95% conﬁdence interval (esti-
mated by posterior simulation from logistic regression of bar passage on pretreatment covariates and treat-
ment indicator with preprocessed data). The left panel plots the average causal effect for all students. The
right panel plots the average causal effect for black students only. This Figure shows that the causal effect
on bar passage is negligible or not detectable for similarly-qualiﬁed students.
limitations, Table 2 presents balance statistics on only a subset of these covariates for which the absolute t-
statistic in the raw data exceeded 4. Clearly, top-tier students differ in a host of characteristics not accounted
for by Sander: they are generally wealthier (“income5” t-stat=6.7), older (“DOB yr” t-stat=14.0), take the
bar in different jurisdictions, such as in the far west, where underlying bar passage rates differ (“region1FW”
t-stat=11.8), are more likely to report that English is their best language (“english.bestY” t-stat=10.2), are
much more likely to attend law school full time and during the day (“fulltime” t-stat=-20.8 and “day.night”
t-stat=-22.6), are less likely to have ﬁnancial dependents (“dependentsN” t-stat=9.1), are much more likely
to be single (“marital1” t-stat=11.4), and have fewer children (“children” t-stat=-10.9). Matching on these
180 covariates yields balance on all covariates, with absolute t-statistics less than 2 for all 180 covariates
(n = 3,128). Figure 5 presents histograms of selected covariates for all non-top-tier (solid line) and top-
tier students (grey). The dashed histogram overlays the distribution of covariates for matched non-top-
tier students, showing that matching achieves substantial balance. Having achieved balance, I then run a
9logistic regression on the matched dataset to assess the effect of tier.6 This yields an average treatment
effect of attending a top-tier law school on the probability of bar passage of -0.005 (SE=0.004), statistically
indistinguishable from 0. In short, there is no evidence that for similarly-situated students, attending a
top-tier school has any effect on bar passage rates.
4 Conclusion
Assessing the impact of afﬁrmative action is a difﬁcult task. In light of the substantial impact on education,
law, and policy, scholars should bear the burden to do so in a scientiﬁcally rigorous fashion.7 I ﬁnd that
Sander’s analysis is based on internally inconsistent assumptions leading to unwarranted conclusions about
afﬁrmative action. Although the job market analysis is outside the scope of this Comment, the problem of
controllingforaconsequenceofthecausewouldalsoinvalidatetheeffectsoflawschooltieronlabormarket
outcomes, since Sander also controls for law school grades in these analyses.8 In addition to contradicting
Sander’s conclusion, our ﬁndings also are substantively interesting. For aspiring law students who are
qualiﬁed to attend a higher tier, the marginal decision to do so is likely to have little impact on ultimately
passing the bar. Much of the game appears to be in law school admissions. In addition, our ﬁndings suggest
that at least with respect to bar passage, afﬁrmative action does not appear to hurt black students. Our
research leaves open considering the role of legal education given the ﬁnding that law school tier has no
causal effect on bar passage.
6We report results from a logistic regression with top-tier indicator, propensity score, LSAT, UGPA, race, and gender covariates,
which corresponds to the original Sander equation. Because balance has already been achieved by preprocessing, the result of the
treatment effect is robust to covariate selection at the analysis stage (Ho et al., 2004). In other words, because treatment is already
balanced along confounding covariates, the treatment effect estimate is not affected by controlling for covariates.
7While I have focused on one particular aspect of Sander’s analysis, there are a host of other statistical issues that could threaten
the validity of inferences. For example, the incomparability of the law school GPA, which is scaled separately for each school,
makes the grade calculations highly suspect. Also, Sander assumes that non-response to the LSAC survey is completely random,
which is very unlikely (16% of bar passage data alone is missing). Inferences are therefore likely biased and should be accounted
for by imputation. Nonetheless, even staying within the framework provided by Sander, the conclusions fail.
8For a critique of the job market ﬁndings on different grounds, see Dauber (2005).
10Full Dataset Matched Dataset
Covariate ¯ x1 ¯ x0 SD t-stat Bias ¯ x1 ¯ x0 SD t-stat Bias Reduction
pscore 0.270 0.059 0.122 40.754 1.040 0.270 0.257 0.194 1.875 0.064 Yes
asian 0.066 0.036 0.191 4.707 0.122 0.066 0.061 0.244 0.587 0.021 Yes
lsat 41.931 36.406 5.418 47.620 1.275 41.931 41.897 4.292 0.225 0.008 Yes
ugpa 3.506 3.208 0.414 33.042 0.885 3.506 3.499 0.329 0.598 0.021 Yes
DOB yr 66.799 65.371 5.166 14.010 0.382 66.799 66.653 3.756 1.081 0.039 Yes
region1FW 0.254 0.121 0.337 11.843 0.306 0.254 0.281 0.443 −1.656 −0.060 Yes
region1GL 0.255 0.170 0.381 7.481 0.195 0.255 0.228 0.428 1.754 0.062 Yes
region1MW 0.010 0.054 0.219 −14.345 −0.430 0.010 0.008 0.094 0.759 0.025 Yes
region1Mt 0.024 0.055 0.224 −7.365 −0.202 0.024 0.025 0.155 −0.115 −0.004 Yes
region1NW 0.002 0.008 0.086 −4.676 −0.136 0.002 0.003 0.047 −0.378 −0.015 Yes
region1SC 0.036 0.111 0.307 −14.394 −0.404 0.036 0.033 0.182 0.492 0.017 Yes
region1SE 0.070 0.130 0.331 −8.718 −0.236 0.070 0.057 0.244 1.469 0.050 Yes
region2FW 0.254 0.120 0.336 11.899 0.308 0.254 0.281 0.443 −1.697 −0.062 Yes
region2GL 0.254 0.171 0.382 7.389 0.192 0.254 0.228 0.428 1.756 0.062 Yes
region2MW 0.010 0.054 0.219 −14.452 −0.434 0.010 0.008 0.094 0.759 0.025 Yes
region2Mt 0.024 0.056 0.225 −7.435 −0.204 0.024 0.024 0.154 0.000 0.000 Yes
region2NW 0.002 0.008 0.086 −4.676 −0.136 0.002 0.003 0.047 −0.378 −0.015 Yes
region2SC 0.036 0.110 0.306 −14.272 −0.400 0.036 0.033 0.182 0.492 0.017 Yes
region2SE 0.071 0.130 0.332 −8.543 −0.231 0.071 0.058 0.245 1.531 0.052 Yes
bar1 yr 94.109 94.175 0.419 −7.027 −0.188 94.109 94.105 0.345 0.362 0.013 Yes
bar2 yr 94.146 94.237 0.486 −8.435 −0.226 94.146 94.142 0.403 0.310 0.011 Yes
englishN 0.613 0.740 0.444 −10.042 −0.262 0.613 0.625 0.486 −0.736 −0.026 Yes
englishY 0.386 0.256 0.442 10.281 0.268 0.386 0.373 0.485 0.737 0.026 Yes
english.bestY 0.373 0.245 0.436 10.167 0.265 0.373 0.364 0.483 0.556 0.020 Yes
fulltime 1.011 1.079 0.261 −20.765 −0.653 1.011 1.009 0.099 0.541 0.018 Yes
day.night 1.012 1.088 0.275 −22.595 −0.716 1.012 1.010 0.102 0.525 0.018 Yes
jointY 0.043 0.022 0.151 4.157 0.107 0.043 0.042 0.203 0.177 0.006 Yes
grd.testsN 0.043 0.078 0.264 −6.299 −0.170 0.043 0.042 0.202 0.266 0.009 Yes
grd.testsY 0.950 0.916 0.274 5.843 0.157 0.950 0.956 0.212 −0.760 −0.026 Yes
fulltime.college2 0.005 0.017 0.127 −5.984 −0.171 0.005 0.005 0.071 0.000 0.000 Yes
fulltime.college3 0.012 0.032 0.172 −6.916 −0.193 0.012 0.017 0.118 −1.215 −0.048 Yes
BA.year 89.186 88.376 4.317 9.344 0.254 89.186 89.068 3.235 1.023 0.037 Yes
post.BA.dN 0.951 0.916 0.274 6.171 0.166 0.951 0.956 0.210 −0.595 −0.021 Yes
post.BA.dY 0.028 0.060 0.233 −6.999 −0.191 0.028 0.029 0.167 −0.214 −0.008 Yes
law.help.aN 0.992 0.981 0.133 4.238 0.117 0.992 0.994 0.084 −0.856 −0.028 Yes
law.help.aY 0.000 0.005 0.067 −9.667 −Inf 0.000 0.000 0.000 Yes
law.help.eN 0.968 0.942 0.229 5.383 0.145 0.968 0.973 0.169 −0.846 −0.029 Yes
law.help.eY 0.013 0.030 0.168 −5.341 −0.147 0.013 0.013 0.115 0.000 0.000 Yes
grad.applyN 0.492 0.425 0.495 5.079 0.133 0.492 0.501 0.500 −0.536 −0.019 Yes
ftjobN 0.705 0.633 0.480 5.939 0.157 0.705 0.706 0.456 −0.078 −0.003 Yes
ftjobY 0.295 0.365 0.480 −5.841 −0.154 0.295 0.293 0.456 0.118 0.004 Yes
dependentsN 0.965 0.920 0.266 9.127 0.251 0.965 0.965 0.183 0.000 0.000 Yes
dependentsY 0.026 0.073 0.254 −10.782 −0.301 0.026 0.029 0.164 −0.656 −0.024 Yes
abroadN 0.928 0.961 0.199 −4.892 −0.126 0.928 0.935 0.252 −0.781 −0.027 Yes
abroadY 0.063 0.031 0.180 5.020 0.130 0.063 0.059 0.239 0.373 0.013 Yes
policeY 0.001 0.008 0.085 −5.937 −0.184 0.001 0.001 0.036 0.000 0.000 Yes
f.head.work5 0.286 0.236 0.427 4.232 0.111 0.286 0.305 0.456 −1.176 −0.042 Yes
m.head.work5 0.527 0.425 0.495 7.777 0.204 0.527 0.522 0.499 0.251 0.009 Yes
m.head.work9 0.054 0.089 0.282 −5.762 −0.155 0.054 0.055 0.227 −0.079 −0.003 Yes
f.head.educ5 0.123 0.219 0.408 −10.792 −0.290 0.123 0.131 0.333 −0.644 −0.023 Yes
f.head.educ11 0.268 0.184 0.393 7.251 0.189 0.268 0.268 0.443 0.000 0.000 Yes
m.head.educ5 0.070 0.120 0.321 −7.268 −0.195 0.070 0.073 0.258 −0.277 −0.010 Yes
m.head.educ7 0.066 0.098 0.294 −4.843 −0.129 0.066 0.065 0.247 0.145 0.005 Yes
m.head.educ11 0.481 0.379 0.487 7.768 0.204 0.481 0.466 0.499 0.823 0.029 Yes
income3 0.270 0.362 0.479 −7.811 −0.207 0.270 0.275 0.445 −0.281 −0.010 Yes
income4 0.489 0.432 0.496 4.327 0.114 0.489 0.497 0.500 −0.429 −0.015 Yes
income5 0.136 0.076 0.272 6.746 0.175 0.136 0.130 0.340 0.473 0.017 Yes
marital1 0.868 0.764 0.420 11.382 0.306 0.868 0.853 0.347 1.186 0.043 Yes
marital2 0.120 0.199 0.395 −9.011 −0.241 0.120 0.132 0.332 −0.970 −0.035 Yes
marital3 0.012 0.035 0.178 −7.683 −0.216 0.012 0.015 0.114 −0.786 −0.030 Yes
marital4 0.000 0.001 0.032 −4.693 −Inf 0.000 0.000 0.000 Yes
children 0.058 0.184 0.635 −10.890 −0.301 0.058 0.065 0.390 −0.504 −0.017 Yes
Table 2: Balance of 62 observable covariates for which the absolute t-statistic exceeded 4 in full data,
between ﬁrst-tier and non-ﬁrst-tier schools for full (n = 20,827) and matched dataset (n = 3,128), where
units were matched by one-to-one nearest neighbor matching on the propensity score (estimated using 180
covariates in a logistic model). After matching, balance is achieved on all 180 covariates, with no absolute
t-statistics below 2. 110
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Figure 5: Histograms of Selected Covariates for Top-Tier (grey) and Non-Top-Tier Students (solid line)
and Matched Non-Top-Tier Students (dashed line). This ﬁgure illustrates substantial differences of the raw
data and that matching achieves balance on covariates since the dashed histogram of matched non-top-tier
students substantially overlaps with the grey histogram of top-tier students
12A Appendix: The Pathology of Post-Treatment Bias
The danger of post-treatment bias is perhaps one of the most overlooked problems in observational studies,
so it is not entirely surprising that no researcher has to date uncovered this in the Sander analysis. To
illustrate just how pathological the problem can be, consider a stylized example in Table 3.9 If smoking
causes both low birth weight and increases the mortality rate, controlling for birth weight leads to a reversal
of the causal effect. For example in the Table, the overall mortality rate is higher for parents who are
smokers (0.55) than for non-smokers (0.35). However, by controlling for birth weight, infant mortality rate
is actually lower for both high-birth-weight and low-birth-weight smokers than for non-smokers! How can
this be? This is the reverse of what statisticians call “Simpson’s paradox,” namely that aggregate proportions
can be reversed by controlling for some covariate. By wrongly controlling for birth weight (which is itself
a consequence of smoking), we may estimate the exact opposite causal effect. To get a sense of just how
problematic this is, even if smoking had been randomly assigned in a classic experiment, post-treatment
bias would be induced by controlling for birth weight, yielding the wrong estimate. This is the issue in the
Sander analysis: the mismatch effect posits that black students getting admitted into a higher-tier school will
cause grades to drop and to fail the bar. Yet in estimating the causal effect on bar passage, Sander cannot
control for law school grades. I show that as a result, his ﬁndings are largely an artifact of post-treatment
bias. For a more formal treatment, see Rosenbaum (1984).
Low Birth Weight High Birth Weight Overall
Infant Smoker Non-smoker Smoker Non-smoker Smoker Non-smoker
Death n Proportion n Proportion n Proportion n Proportion Proportion
Yes 60 0.60 9 0.90 1 0.10 30 0.30 0.55 0.35
No 40 0.40 1 0.10 9 0.90 70 0.70 0.45 0.65
Table 3: Example of Post-Treatment Bias. This Table provides a numerical example showing that control-
ling for a covariate (birth weight) that is itself a consequence of a cause (smoking) can seriously deceive.
While the overall infant mortality rate for smokers is 0.55 and for non-smokers is 0.35, the infant mortality
rate is (wrongly!) lower for both low-birth-weight and high-birth-weight children of smokers than non-
smokers (0.60 vs. 0.90 and 0.10 vs. 0.30, respectively). n represents the number of children and proportion
represents the fraction of children dying at birth.
9This example is often known as the Wilcox-Russel hypothesis.
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